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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question regarding the legal status of the embryo hinges 
around a more conceptual —or, rather, more fundamental— legal 
distinction, namely, the distinction between “things” and 
“persons.” What is involved here is determining whether 
embryonic human life is personal life and, thus, whether the 
embryo has rights, or whether is it just the object of somebody 
else´s rights.  
This radical discussion becomes apparent in other more 
technical and concrete debates about the relationship between the 
value of human life and its stage of biological development, or its 
viability perspectives.1 The claim that the legal value of embryonic 
life depends upon its stage of development and its viability 
perspectives is, as shall be discussed later, one of the main 
                                                                                                             
 1. In statutory law, this claim has been performed by means of the much 
discussed conceptual distinction between embryos and “pre-embryos” as can be 
seen, for example, in Spanish legislation concerning the donation and use of 
embryos (Ley No. 42, 1988) for therapeutic or scientific research use, and the 
Law concerning assisted reproduction (Ley No. 35, 1988). For a critical review 
of the ethical and legal implications of this conceptual distinction in American 
Constitutional Law, see, e.g., Joshua S. Vincinguerra, Showing “Special 
Respect” – Permitting the Gestation of Abandoned Preembryos, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. 
& TECH. 399, 405 (1999); and more recently, Robert Stenger, Embryos, Fetuses 
and Babies: Treated as Persons and Treated with Respect, 2 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMED. L. 33, 33 (2006). 
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arguments in favor of the right to abortion in American 
constitutional case law and, extensively, in favor of the right–and 
sometimes duty–to discard embryos. This claim is grounded, at 
least, on two normative propositions. According to the first one, 
constitutional norms would admit the existence of legal 
personhood only after birth, and/or would make the legal value of 
non-personal unborn life depend on its viability. The second 
proposition states that, in the light of the un-personhood of the 
embryo, the constitutional principle of equality would not be 
applicable to them.  
As shall be described, Argentine constitutional case law 
rejects—with some exceptions—those distinctions based upon the 
contrary normative premises, according to which constitutional 
principles admit the personal quality in each and every human 
being from the time of conception, which is, in turn, set at the 
moment of fertilization. On this basis, it is understood that these 
same norms would recognize equal dignity in every person and 
would proscribe making the legal value of human life–which is 
always the life of a person–depend on the stage of development or 
on the (chances of) viability inside or outside the mother´s womb. 
Two mutually complementary analyses will be examined in the 
next paragraphs. An Argentine and U.S. case law review will be 
carried out in order to infer the arguments that have been posed in 
both constitutional practices regarding the acceptance or rejection 
of those conceptual distinctions (sections II & III).  
This comparative approach is justified by the fact that, as it has 
been insistently pointed out by various ius-philosophical schools of 
thought, the abstract nature of constitutional language is an open 
door to political, ethical, and philosophical assessments or, in 
Rawlsian terms, to the “comprehensive conceptions” of those who 
interpret and adjudicate law. In this light, although the arguments 
for legal protection of embryonic life and the counterarguments for 
a lack of legal protection of embryonic life arise in different 
normative contexts, the creative nature of constitutional 
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interpretation justifies the comparative approach propounded in 
this review.  
However, there is more to constitutional interpretation than 
mere creativity. In order to be framed within a particular legal 
practice, legal interpretation should confine itself to two kinds of 
requirements. On the one hand, it should be coherent with the 
values, goods or ends that should be common to all legal practices 
in order to distinguish themselves from sheer violence.2 On the 
other hand, legal interpretation should conform to the way that the 
particular legal practice within which it finds itself determines 
those common values, goods or ends which are common to all 
legal practices. This means that it should take into account the 
semantic and syntactic rules that apply to the legal statements 
under interpretation. 
Creativity in interpretation operates, accordingly, within the 
framework of two margins: the teleological one and the linguistic 
or, more generally, the semantic one. These restrictions to 
interpretative creativity also set logical limits to the transposition 
of arguments from one constitutional practice, such as that of the 
                                                                                                             
 2. See PILAR ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD EN LA 
INTERPRETACIÓN JURÍDICA. UNA APROXIMACIÓN IUSFILOSÓFICA A LA TESIS DE 
LA DISCRECIONALIDAD 65 (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 2009; no. 142 
in the ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS series) [hereinafter ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE 
CREATIVIDAD]. Among the many authors who agree on the description of 
interpretation as a comprehensive task which includes a creative dimension, not 
to be confused with unrestricted discretion, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at Ch. I-IV (Harvard Univ. Press 1977); RONALD DWORKIN, 
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE at Ch. I-VI (Clarendon Press 1985; RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 65-68, 411-413 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986); RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW. THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 10 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1996); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 18-21 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2006). For a critical review in Spanish language of 
Dworkin´s proposal, see Pilar Zambrano, Objetividad en la interpretacion 
judicial y objetividad en el Derecho. Una reflexion a partir de las luces y 
sombras en la propuesta de Ronald Dworkin, 56 PERSONA Y DERECHO 281 
(2007), and ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD 37-53. The most relevant 
author insisting on the possible synthesis of creativity and objectivity in 
interpretation, outside the English language field, is perhaps ROBERT ALEXY, A 
THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS 
THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 17 (Ruther Adler & Neil MacCormick trans., 
Clarendon Press 1989).   
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U.S., to another, such as that of Argentina. Therefore, the benefit 
of the proposed comparative analysis will depend upon the 
adequacy of the questions that are posed. With these restrictions in 
mind, the questions that this comparative study aims to answer are:  
Which is the justificatory or teleological perspective of 
interpretation assumed or postulated in each of these case law 
practices? (Section IV B(1)) 
Which is the semantic theory underlining the whole 
interpretative process in each of these case law practices? (Section 
IV B(2)) 
Which of these teleological and semantic postulates best fit the 
final aims or values of constitutional law? (Section V) 
In the end, we aim to reflect upon the reciprocal influence 
between these two margins of interpretation. Particularly, we 
intend to test the coherence between, on the one side, the claim that 
fundamental rights are deontological and, on the other, the 
assumption of a constructive or criterial semantic theory of 
language in the interpretation of the concept of legal personhood 
(section V).  
II. THE EMBRYO IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW  
Although the status of the embryo is not regulated by federal 
statutory law, it may be induced from the federal Supreme Court 
decisions concerning the issue of abortion that, as a whole, 
establish the legal status of the unborn in its various gestational 
stages. The leading cases in this line are the well-known Roe v. 
Wade3 and Casey.4 
A. The Value of the Embryo´s Life under Roe v.Wade  
The famous case of Roe v. Wade, argued before the United 
States Supreme Court, challenged a Texas criminal abortion statute 
                                                                                                             
 3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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which penalized abortions in all cases, except when pregnancy 
meant a risk to the life of the mother. 
The District Court found the Texas Act unconstitutional in the 
light of the 9th Amendment, which admits implicit rights stemming 
from the U.S. Constitution, but denied the injunction that would 
have allowed Roe to benefit from this unconstitutionality. Roe 
filed for an appeal to have the original decision upheld, and to 
obtain the injunction.5  
The Supreme Court analyzed Roe’s claim in the light of the 
fundamental right to privacy, a right that, even if not explicitly 
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, had been recognized by the 
Court in previous cases as a necessary dimension of other liberty 
rights that were explicitly recognized.6 The Court, then, had to 
decide whether the choice to abort was one of the dimensions of 
that fundamental right or preferred freedom, what its extent was, 
and to which constitutional clause it was related. These decisions 
called for a previous determination as to the moment in which the 
U.S. Constitution admits the existence of personhood in law. In 
this sense, the Court asserted that:  
The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a 
“person” within the language and meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . If this suggestion of 
personhood is established, the appellant’s case, of course, 
collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be 
guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.7 
The majority solved this interpretative question by denying the 
fetus´s personhood on the basis of semantic, syntactic and 
historical arguments. From both the semantic and the syntactic 
points of view, it was argued that none of the constitutional clauses 
define the meaning of the word “person,” and that each time such 
word is used, it is with reference to human beings that have already 
                                                                                                             
 5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 122. 
 6. Id. at 153-55. 
 7. Id. at 157.  
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been born.8 From the historical point of view, it was stated that at 
the time that the 14th Amendment was passed, and during most of 
the nineteenth century, state legislation relating to abortion was 
much more permissive than it currently was. This historical fact, 
combined with the presumption that the authors of the Texas 
legislation under review knew about this legal context, would 
indicate that the constitutional drafters had no intention to include 
the unborn as subject to the rights established in that Amendment.9 
Relying on these arguments, the Court concluded that the term 
“person,” as used in the Constitution, does not apply to the 
unborn.10 
Out of conceptual necessity, the denial of the personhood of 
the unborn became the denial of the right to life before birth. But 
this denial did not prevent the United States Supreme Court from 
recognizing a legitimate state interest in the protection of 
embryonic and fetal life, which was called “potential human life.” 
Nevertheless, as the right to abortion had been recognized as a 
“preferred freedom” or “fundamental right,” the constitutionality 
of the rules regulating abortion in view of this interest depended on 
whether or not they passed the strict scrutiny test: that is, the 
requirement that the states justify both the compelling nature of the 
interests at stake and the norms they are seeking to promote – i.e., 
that a compelling state interest exists, as well as the necessary 
relationship between them.11  
Based on this, the Court recognized the already renowned 
three-stage balancing of rights that is comprised of the right of the 
mother to abort, and the two state interests that have been deemed 
legitimate.12 According to this three-stage concept, the Court 
understood that it is only during the third trimester that the state 
                                                                                                             
 8. Id. at 158. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 159. 
 12. Id. at 163-64. 
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interest in the protection of the “potential human life” acquires 
enough relevance so as to justify the criminalization of abortion.  
B. Balancing the Right to Abortion and State Interest in Potential 
Human Life  
Regarding our object of interest, Roe’s conceptual inheritance 
is that legal personhood is not recognized by constitutional text and 
practice until birth, but, nevertheless, there is a legitimate state 
interest in “potential human life” from the moment of conception.  
Taking Casey13 as a landmark case in post-Roe case law, the 
balancing standards between the right of the mother to abort and 
the state interest in potential human life were constructed around 
the following issues: (a) whether states were or were not enabled to 
set forth a legal duty that women perform fetal viability tests prior 
to the abortive proceedings that were carried out during the second 
trimester; (b) what was the constitutionally admissible content of 
informed consent prior to abortive proceedings, and who had to 
provide it; and (c) whether or not the states were enabled to 
promote their interest in potential human life by means other than 
prohibiting abortion during the first two trimesters.  
Regarding the issue of compulsory fetal viability exams, the 
Court issued contradictory statements, first banishing them and 
then opening the way to them.14 With varied grounds and a 
crucially tight majority, the Court cleared the way in Webster, 
affirming that state regulations could establish compulsory pre-
procedure medical viability tests independent from the trimester in 
which the tests were ordered, under the sole condition that viability 
                                                                                                             
 13. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 14. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-65 
(1976), banishing State intrusion, and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-97 
(1979), allowing it. 
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was possible according to ordinary medical criteria and the exams 
did not pose a risk to the mother’s health.15 
As to the content of informed consent, the Court found that any 
state regulations aimed at deterring the mother from her decision to 
abort rather than informing her about the risks involved in an 
abortion proceeding were contrary to the Constitution. These 
regulations were deemed to ignore the trimester scheme involved 
in Roe, and were therefore deemed unconstitutional.16  
Finally, regarding the non-coercive use of the sovereign power, 
the Court held, invariably—although on a tight majority―that the 
states were not under an obligation to assign public funds to 
provide abortions nor were they under an obligation to perform 
abortive proceedings in public health institutions, even when either 
of those choices implicitly promoted childbirth over abortion.17 
Along this line of thought, it was also held that a state could 
lawfully establish that human life starts at conception in so far as 
such statement did not have the practical effect of casting aside the 
balancing trimester schema.18  
To sum up, as it was pointed out in the plurality opinion in 
Webster, the Court had progressively become a kind of medical 
committee, assisted by legislative powers, regarding the most 
varied implications of abortive proceedings: establishing how long 
of a waiting period prior to abortion procedures the law should set; 
what issues had to be included in the informed consent and which 
were to be excluded; who could provide the informed consent; 
when was it legitimate to conclude that the fetus was viable and 
                                                                                                             
 15. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 515-21 
(opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., White, J. and Kennedy, J.); 526 (concurring opinion 
of O´Connor, J.); and 538 (concurring opinion of Scalia, J.) (1989).  
 16. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. (1983), 
443-45; later confirmed in Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn., 
476 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1986). 
 17. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-79 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 519, 521 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980). 
 18. Webster v. Reproductive Health Svcs., 492 U.S. at 513.  
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when was it legitimate to conclude it was not viable; what the 
consequences were; etc.19 
Along this process, the function of the Roe tripartite schema 
became blurred and increasingly murky. It was expected that it 
would provide clear and precise criteria regarding the way in 
which the state’s interests and the case law-based rights of the 
mother to abort were to be balanced; however, only case law 
dealing with informed consent stands as a seamless application of 
the schema. The remainder of the questions posed before the Court 
only succeeded in stretching the strings to the breaking point, as 
was highlighted particularly in Webster, in which four judges 
issued a dissenting opinion,20 but no explicit majority was reached 
because there were not five judges reaffirming or holding the 
constitutional validity of Roe.  
In addition to all this, the decisions of the Court were almost 
always made, as in Roe, with an extremely narrow majority that 
remained united at the level of the judgment, but at variance when 
it came to providing the reasoning for the decisions. Disparate 
grounds and miniscule majorities resulted in an unsurprisingly 
complex set of rules that offered, to the law community in general, 
and the states’ highest courts in particular, confusion instead of 
clarity. This state of confusion was specifically acknowledged by 
the majority in Casey,21 and this is why it could be affirmed that 
the cards were, in a way, reshuffled.  
Indeed, in Casey, the Court revised both the tripartite temporal 
schema and the rights and interests balancing criteria. Regarding 
the schema, it was decided that the viability of the fetus outside the 
mother´s womb, and not the length of the pregnancy (i.e., the third 
trimester) is what established the point at which the state interest in 
protecting “potential human life” becomes compelling enough to 
                                                                                                             
 19. Id. at 517-18. 
 20. Blackmun, J. and Stevens, J. issued dissenting opinions, and Brennan, J. 
and Marshall, J. joined Blackmun, J.´s opinion. 
 21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 944-51. 
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legitimize a ban on abortion. Regarding the balancing criteria, it 
was admitted that, even prior to viability, the state interest in 
protecting and promoting potential human life is important enough 
to enable the states to legitimately promote said potential human 
life in an active manner, provided that this promotion did not 
presuppose an obstacle or an undue burden on the exercise of the 
right to abort. On these grounds, and contrary to prior decisions, it 
declared that state measures aimed at discouraging the mother 
from the decision to abort were constitutionally valid.22 
C. Some Conclusions 
According to this review, it can be gathered that the value of 
human life is not uniform according to the United States Supreme 
Court case law regarding abortion, for it varies according to the 
development stage that the fetus may have reached. Three different 
stages can be individualized. The first would correspond to “non-
viable potential human life,” which starts at conception and lasts 
until the moment when the fetus is viable outside the mother´s 
womb, with or without artificial assistance. The second stage 
would correspond to “viable potential human life,” and it would 
start at the beginning of viability outside the mother´s womb, until 
birth. The third stage is personal human life, which starts at birth 
and ends with natural death.  
Embryos would fit into the first stage, “non-viable potential 
human life,” and this is why they could be classified as an object of 
a state interest, characterized by the United States Supreme Court 
in the following manner: 
It is optional for states to promote state or local interests in 
potential human life.  
As a state interest, it is not compelling enough so as to justify 
the limitation of the mother´s right to obtain an abortion, but it is 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. at 874-76. 
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strong enough so as to justify compulsory measures aiming at 
deterring the decision to abort. 
The states can overtly favor the promotion of embryonic life, 
as long as this does not pose an undue burden on the mother´s right 
to abort prior to the moment of fetal viability outside the mother´s 
womb. 
D. The States’ Case Law on Embryos 
The optional status of both the promotion and the 
determination of the weight of the state interest in non-viable 
potential human life—within the limits established by the Court—
becomes legally active, at both the federal and state levels, in a 
fabric that is woven with the most diverse criteria regarding the 
legal status of the embryo.  
That status is defined by the states only on an exceptional 
basis, as would be the case in the state of Louisiana. In the case of 
the other states, as well as at the federal level, the status may be 
inferred from the regulation of different activities that are directly 
or indirectly related to the use or destination given to embryos 
conceived in vitro. The most relevant of these activities are those 
that have to do with assisted reproduction, and with the scientific 
and technological research that requires using, and possibly 
discarding, embryos. The embryo’s status will depend, essentially, 
on the existence, or lack thereof, of limitations to embryo discard. 
Only the legislation of the state of Louisiana and that of New 
Mexico establish a ban on the sale, destruction or any other process 
that does not involve embryo implantation for later development. 
This establishes a duty of care and custody on those clinics in 
which the embryos were created.23 On the opposite side, states 
such as California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts and 
                                                                                                             
 23. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:126; N.M. STAT. § 24-9A-[1][g]. For a comparative 
study of these two statutes, see Diane K. Yang, What’s Mine is Mine but What’s 
Yours Should Also Be Mine: An Analysis of State Statutes that Mandate the 
Implantation of Frozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 587 (2002). 
 
 
2013] SEMANTICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION 109 
 
New Jersey expressly establish the duty of medical service 
providers to inform the patient of the possibility of discarding 
embryos that were not implanted. However, these same statutes 
prohibit the sale or commercialization of the embryos, whatever 
the final aim.24 Other states, such as Oklahoma, take up an 
ambiguous attitude: even if they only allow for heterologous 
conception when performed with a reproductive aim, they omit 
establishing the same limitation in the field of homologous 
conception, and also fail to clarify what will be the final use of 
those embryos that, even if conceived for a reproductive purpose, 
were never implanted.25  
At the federal level, ever since the Clinton presidency, a ban 
has been in place on the use of federal funds for the creation of 
human embryos for research purposes or for research in which the 
human embryos were destroyed, discarded or intentionally 
subjected to a risk of damage or death greater than the risk allowed 
in research involving fetuses inside the uterus (commonly known 
as the “Dickey Amendment”).26 This limitation was not extended 
to include privately funded or state funded, research. However, in 
March 2009, President Obama issued executive order 13505, 
                                                                                                             
 24. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125305; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a, 
32d-32g; MD. CODE ECON. DEV. § 5-2B-10; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111L; N.J. 
STAT. § 26:2 Z-2.  
 25. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 555. For a comparative synthesis of states’ 
legislation concerning assisted fertilization, see http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ 
health/genetics/embfet.htm (last visited Jul. 12, 2013).  
 26. This prohibition was not included in a specific statute concerning 
scientific research on embryos, but was instead included, at the initiative of 
Senator Jay Dickey, in the Balanced Budget Down Payment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 
104-99, § 128(2), 1.10 Stat. 26, 34 (1996), and reapproved each year until 2009. 
For a detailed and complete description of the federal politics concerning the 
funding of the use of embryos in scientific research, see Monitoring Stem Cell 
Research. A Report of the President´s Council on Bioethics, Washington D.C., 
January 2004, available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/ 
stemcell/ (last visited Jul. 17, 2013). A chronologic synthesis of American state 
law concerning stem cell research can be found at http://lti-
blog.blogspot.com/2009/08/lifting-ban-or-obfuscating-truth-bob.html (a pro-life 
blog, last visited Jul. 12, 2013).  
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which removed limitations on the use of federal funds for research 
on new embryonic stem-cell lines.27  
Against this backdrop of complex, intertwined criteria, 
constitutional case law at the state level has basically hinged 
around the issue of who has the right to decide what the use of the 
non-implanted embryos or pre-embryos will be, and with what 
requirements, when there is no agreement between the parents in 
this respect.  
1. Davis v. Davis and Kass v. Kass 
The leading case in this matter was Davis v. Davis,28 a famous 
case settled by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1992. It involved 
the fate of seven embryos that had been conceived by in vitro 
fertilization. At the time when the progenitors divorced, the 
embryos were kept under cryopreservation in the clinic in which 
the progenitors had been given the corresponding treatment.  
Initially, and contrary to the wishes of Mary Sue Davis, one of 
the progenitors, that the embryos be implanted in her uterus, Junior 
Lewis Davis, the other progenitor, wanted them to remain under 
cryopreservation until he came to a decision regarding their use. 
By the time the case reached the state Supreme Court, both parties 
had changed their claims. Mary Sue wanted the embryos to be 
donated to any couple that was willing to undergo fertility 
treatment, insisting on the personal nature (personhood) of the 
embryos. Junior Lewis wanted them to be discarded. Mary Sue´s 
contention of embryonic personhood was accepted at the trial court 
level, explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals, and, eventually, 
by the state Supreme Court.  
Apart from denying the personal nature of the embryos on the 
basis of the Roe v. Wade ruling, the state Supreme Court also 
denied that the state interest in “potential human life,” 
                                                                                                             
 27. Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10667 (Mar. 11, 2009). 
 28. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
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acknowledged as legitimate and optional for states in Roe v. Wade 
and reaffirmed in Webster, was compelling enough as to settle the 
issue in favor of the implantation of the embryos. Relying on state 
precedents, and on civil and criminal law regulations regarding the 
fetus’ status when it is inside the mother´s womb, the Court 
concluded that the State of Tennessee had no adopted interest 
whatsoever in the “potential human life” of the un-implanted 
embryos.  
Therefore, the un-implanted embryos were not the object of 
any state interest in potential human life, let alone persons. Even 
so, the Court conceptualized a new category for embryos that 
placed them in between property and personhood, to which a 
special respect was owed given its potential to become a person. In 
reality, this intermediate category was closer to property than to 
personhood, for the progenitors´ rights on un-implanted embryos 
were deemed “in the nature of a property interest,” and included 
the right to decide on their disposal.29  
On these grounds, the Court set forth a principle of 
interpretation, whereby whenever there is no agreement between 
the parties, the courts should decide the matter by balancing the 
opposing interests. Applying this principle to the case, the Court 
set forth the rule in which the interest of one of the parties in 
obviating fatherhood or motherhood (in this case, the father) is 
stronger or greater than the interest of the opposing party (in this 
case, the mother) in donating the embryos for future implantation.  
Kass v. Kass30 continued the development of state common law 
in the matter of determining the use of un-implanted embryos 
whenever there is disagreement between the progenitors. Unlike 
Davis, here there was a prior written agreement that established 
that if the parties became unable to agree on the use of the un-
implanted embryos, they would be donated to be used in assisted 
reproduction scientific research.  
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. at 596.  
 30. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
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Although this agreement between the clinic and the parties was 
later ratified in the divorce decree, the woman asked that the 
embryos be implanted in her, against the husband`s wish that the 
agreement be executed. In all of the judicial proceedings, the 
debate hinged on the correct interpretation of the agreement signed 
between the parties and the clinic.  
The New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of 
the trial court that the agreement was clear that in event of 
disagreement between the parties, the un-implanted embryos had 
to be used for scientific research, and so decreed that the embryos 
(described as pre-zygotes) be given for that use.31  
2. Will as the Ultimate Determinant of the Embryo´s Life Value
The binding nature of the common will of the couple, as 
expressed in the covenants written by them or as agreed upon 
between themselves and the clinic, was reaffirmed in Litowitz,32 
even when the parties subsequently agree to deviate from the 
agreement. 
In this case, what was at stake was the use of embryos that had 
been conceived with the husband’s reproductive material, and an 
ovule donated to the couple by a female third party. The agreement 
between the Litowitzes and the clinic prescribed that, if the 
embryos were not implanted within five years’ time after their 
conception, the clinic should thaw them; in effect, destroy them. 
Within a divorce context, and after the five-year deadline had 
expired, both parties communicated their decision that the embryos 
that were still frozen be implanted. The issue between the 
divorcing parties was not whether or not they should be implanted, 
but rather, in whom. Mrs. Litowitz wanted the embryos to be 
implanted in her, and the ex-husband wanted the embryos to be 
donated to another woman. The Washington state court did not 
31. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178.
32. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
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provide a solution for this problem, for no proof had been 
produced during the trial to show that the embryos were still alive. 
Even so, the Court ventured to say that, even if their existence 
were proven, their use should be regulated by the terms of the 
agreement; i.e., they should be thawed (destroyed).33 
In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the 
female progenitor’s contention that the agreement signed by the 
clinic and both of the progenitors, according to which, in case of 
divorce, the embryos would be implanted at any of the parties’ 
request, be enforced. This Court relied, among other grounds, on 
the theory that to compel a person to become a father or a mother 
against his or her will was contrary to public policy, even if they 
had contractually bound themselves to procreate.34 This holding 
was later reapplied by the Iowa Supreme Court In re Marriage of 
Witten35 and, by way of obitur dictum, by a Texas Court of 
Appeals, in Roman v. Roman.36  
3. Some Conclusions
a. Un-implanted embryos are not conceptually persons, either
under federal or state constitutional case law. Nevertheless, they 
are considered the object of “special respect” because of their 
potential to become persons, which, although different from the 
respect owed to personal dignity, must be differentiated from the 
treatment that is owed to objects of interest or property rights. 
b. The exclusive right of the mother to dispose of the embryo’s
life, acknowledged in Roe as a privacy right, only refers to 
embryos that are already implanted in the mother’s womb. It 
excludes un-implanted embryos, and therefore, the mother has no 
right to obviate the father’s interests to implant or discard embryos 
that are cryogenically stored.  
33. Id. at 271.
34. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
35. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
36. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex.2006).
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c. The use of un-implanted embryos is regulated, as a rule, by 
the progenitors´ unanimous decision.  
d. In case of disagreement, the written agreement prior to their 
conception is binding, provided that it is unambiguous.  
e. However, the agreement lacks binding force regarding 
embryo implantation. In this respect, the present and concomitant 
meeting of minds of both progenitors is required, both concerning 
the fact of implantation and the body into which they should be 
implanted. Therefore, either progenitor has “veto power” regarding 
embryo implantation, be it in the womb of the mother or in that of 
a third party. 
f. “Special respect” does not mitigate in any way the meeting 
of minds of the progenitors. It is only a relevant interpretative 
criterion to be used whenever the use of the embryos must be 
judicially settled, given a disagreement between the progenitors, 
and in the face of a lack of a previous written agreement settling 
the issue.  
g. The “special respect” principle does not have enough weight 
in the “counterbalancing” of interests as to make the embryo 
implantation compulsory. On the contrary, in this 
counterbalancing, the interest of one party in not producing a child 
is heavier than the interest of the opposing party in gestating the 
embryo or donating the embryo for implantation.  
III. THE EMBRYO IN ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW  
The Argentine case law on embryos offers a rich range of 
interpretations that seem to be firmly established. Young as this 
judicial experience may be, this short time is not an obstacle to 
reviewing the decisions issued by the Argentine Supreme Court, 
which is the highest national court in the federal order, as well as 
those issued by other Argentine courts.  
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A. The Argentine Supreme Court (2001-2012): Tanus, Portal de 
Belén and Sánchez37 
In Tanus38 and Portal de Belén,39 the Argentine Supreme Court 
determined the sense and scope of the constitutional principle of 
the fundamental right to life in relation to embryonic life. Both 
judicial decisions, considered as a whole, give rise to the following 
interpretative rule: this principle is binding in the case of embryos 
with the same scope, as if it were the case of an already-born 
person, and no differences based on its development stage or its 
viability prospects shall be established. 
In Tanus, the majority of the Court affirmed the appealed 
decision, which had authorized the induction of labor of an 
anencephalic fetus in a public hospital. When providing the 
grounds for the decision, the Court pointed out that, even though 
the authorization to induce labor had been requested in the 20th 
week of pregnancy, by the time the case was to be decided by the 
Supreme Court, the mother had reached the 8th month of 
pregnancy. According to the Court, this temporal difference 
allowed for the differentiation of childbirth by induction of labor, 
on the one hand, and abortion on the other. It was argued that the 
death of an anencephalic fetus outside the mother’s womb, when 
the stage of extra-uterine viability is reached, is not to be attributed 
                                                                                                             
 37. On Mar. 13, 2012, in the leading case F.,A.L (CSJN, “F., A.L. s/ medida 
autosatisfactiva,” Fallos 259: XLVI (2012)), the Argentine Supreme Court 
issued a decision concerning women´s legal right to abort in case of rape. 
Although this decision did not openly reject the assertions stated in Portal and 
Tanus concerning the legal personhood of the embryos, it did put in question its 
practical legal effects. It is therefore very likely that the case law era which 
started with Tanus has come to an end with F.,A.L. The purpose of this study 
being to compare the Argentine and the American case laws from the point of 
view of their respective coherence with the conceptual features of fundamental 
rights, this comparison only takes into account the era in which the former is 
relevantly different from the latter. That is, the era which ended in F.,A.L and 
goes from Tanus to Sanchez. 
 38. CSJN, “Tanus, Silvia c/ Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires s/ 
amparo,” Fallos 324: 5 (2001). 
 39. CSJN, “Portal de Belén - Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro c/ 
Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social de la Nación s/amparo,” Fallos 325: 292 
(2002). 
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to the anticipated labor induction, but to the congenital condition 
of the fetus. 
Therefore, according to the Court, the case didn´t concern the 
constitutional validity of abortion, but the way in which two rights 
were to be counterbalanced: the mother’s right to health, and the 
anencephalic fetus’s exercise of its right to life and to health. 
Considering that in the eighth month, premature birth would not 
alter the unavoidable death of the child, the Court understood that 
inducing labor did not alter the essential content of the fetus’s right 
to life or to health. 
Leaving aside for the moment its logical validity, it should be 
noticed that the Court´s reasoning asserted that the fundamental 
right to life is in force from the moment of conception under the 
American Convention for Human Rights, Law 23054, article 4.1., 
and under article 2, Law 23849, which affirms the Children’s 
Rights Convention.40 
In Portal de Belén, the Court reaffirmed this normative 
interpretation, further specifying that conception takes place at the 
moment of fertilization. In stating this, the Court relied on the 
opinion of different geneticists and biologists that “it is a scientific 
fact that the ‘genetic construction' of the person is there [at the 
                                                                                                             
 40. “Tanus,” supra note 38, at cons. 11°. Art. 4 of the American Convention 
for Human Rights states: “Right to life. 1. Every person has a right to her life 
being respected. This right shall be granted by Law and, in general, from the 
moment of conception. Nobody shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (the 
translation is ours). In Spanish: “Derecho a la vida. 1. Toda persona tiene 
derecho a que se respete su vida. Este derecho estará protegido por la ley y, en 
general, a partir del momento de la concepción. Nadie puede ser privado de la 
vida arbitrariamente” (Ley No. 23054, B.O. del 27/2/1984). Article 2 of Law 
23849 states: “When ratifying the Convention, the following reserves and 
declarations shall be stated: (…) In relation to article 1 of the Convention, the 
Argentine Republic declares that it shall be interpreted in the sense that the term 
“child” is understood to refer to all human being from the moment of conception 
and until eighteen years old” (The translation is ours). In Spanish: “Al ratificar 
la Convención, deberán formularse las siguientes reservas y declaraciones: (…) 
Con relación al artículo 1º de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, la 
República Argentina declara que el mismo debe interpretarse en el sentido que 
se entiende por niño todo ser humano desde el moment de su concepción y hasta 
los 18 años de edad” (Ley No. 23849, B.O. del 22/11/1990). 
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time of conception], all set and ready to be biologically aimed, 
because ‘the egg’s’ (zygote’s) DNA contains the anticipated 
description of all the ontogenesis in its tiniest details.”41  
From a factual point of view, the Court considered it proven 
that a contraceptive, the marketing and distribution of which had 
been authorized by the national Ministry of Health and Social 
Action, could operate under three subsidiary mechanisms. 
Contraception could: (i) prevent ovulation, or (ii) operate as a 
spermicide. Neither of these mechanisms posed a constitutional 
objection from the point of view of the embryo’s right to life. In a 
subsidiary manner, for the cases in which these two mechanisms 
had not been successfully activated, the contraceptive challenged 
in Portal would operate by (iii) modifying the endometrial tissue 
and preventing embryo implantation. The Court found that this 
subsidiary mechanism violated the embryo´s right to life.42  
Therefore, on the basis of these normative and factual 
premises, the Supreme Court revoked the appellate court’s 
decision, which considered it lawful for the National Ministry of 
Health and Social Action to authorize the marketing and 
distribution of the contraceptive under challenge. 
After these decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
personhood of the nasciturus in Sánchez,43 leaving aside any 
considerations related to a hypothetical abortion. When 
acknowledging the personhood, the Supreme Court qualified the 
unborn involved in the case as “a person ‘to be born’, this is to say, 
                                                                                                             
 41. “Portal de Belén,” supra note 39, at cons. 7°. 
 42. Id. at cons. 9° and 10°. 
 43. CSJN, “Sánchez, Elvira Berta c/ M° JyDDHH – art. 6° L. 24411 (resol. 
409/01),” Fallos 330: 2304 (2007), in which the Court provided a reminder that 
article 30 of the Argentine Civil Code defines as “persons” all beings capable of 
acquiring rights and contracting debts, and art. 63 extends the concept of person 
to all unborn human beings who are conceived in the mother´s womb. Literally: 
“[E]l art. 30 del Código Civil define como personas a todos los entes 
susceptibles de adquirir derechos, o contraer obligaciones; mientras que el art. 
63 señala como especie del género "persona" a las "personas por nacer,” 
definiéndolas como aquellas que, no habiendo nacido, están concebidas en el 
seno materno.” (cons. 9°).  
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one of the juridical species of the ‘person genus’ under our civil 
law . . . .”44 
B. Some Conclusions 
The principles and rules acknowledged and established in both 
rulings regarding the legal status of the embryo could be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Legal personhood is acknowledged, under Argentine 
constitutional law, from the moment of conception. 
2. Conception is deemed to happen at the moment of 
fertilization.  
3. Any action aimed at interrupting embryotic development 
after the moment fertilization occurs should be banned, even when 
this interruption is merely eventual or probable. 
4. Therefore, the scientific debate regarding the distinction 
between pre-embryos and embryos, or between viable embryos 
and non-viable embryos, lacks legal significance. 
C. Other Courts of Law and the Embryo 
The case law of other courts regarding the legal status of the 
embryo has primarily hinged on the debate over two different 
series of issues: one is whether local birth control policies were 
constitutional, and the other on establishing the use that should be 
assigned to frozen embryos created during fertilization procedures. 
The legal context on which both debates are centered involves, 
primarily, local and federal statutes regulating sex and 
reproductive health. Let us review that debate. 
1. Birth Control Questions 
The trend to regulate the fundamental or constitutional right to 
health, especially as related to sexual and reproductive health, at 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. cons. 11°. 
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the local or provincial (state) level started in the 1990s and has 
continued to grow ever since. Therefore, it is a process that started 
some years before the 1994 constitutional amendment, and at least 
a decade before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the Portal 
de Belén case regarding whether the birth control policies allowing 
the disruption of implantation, or abortive methods in general, 
were constitutional.  
Nevertheless, all statutes issued before and after the 1994 
constitutional amendment made the medical prescription and 
provision of contraceptives dependent on the condition of their 
non-abortive effect. The same condition is set forth in national 
Law 25673, promulgated in 2002.45 Although this law is 
automatically applicable to health services subject to the federal 
jurisdiction of the National Ministry of Health, it also empowers 
the provinces to join the health program created by it. Thus, be it 
effected directly or indirectly, local regulation of sexual and 
reproductive health includes a general ban on abortive methods of 
family planning. 
Notwithstanding this ban, some of these norms, or the 
regulations issued under them, allow contraceptive methods 
regardless of the distinction between those which operate by 
inhibiting fertilization and those which potentially inhibit the 
implantation of the fertilized egg.  
This lack of normative precision was subject to judicial debate 
on different occasions after Portal de Belén. A conclusion that can 
be drawn from this limited, and young, case law corpus, is that the 
debate, at the local or provincial level, does not revolve around 
embryonic personhood―an aspect that is never challenged―but 
rather on the details regarding how to adequately weigh it against 
the mother’s right to reproductive health. Primarily, the debate is 
centered around the normative consequences of the scientific 
debate regarding the anti-implantation mechanism assigned to 
                                                                                                             
 45. Ley No. 25673, art. 6°, B.O. 30032 (Oct. 22, 2002). 
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emergency contraception and to the intra-uterine device, or to any 
contraceptive that happened to operate, or could operate, by 
obstructing the embryo’s development. Regarding this issue, the 
different opinions are detailed in the following paragraphs.  
2. A First Look at Portal: All “Emergency” Contraceptives are 
Held Abortive 
In Asociación Civil Familia y Vida,46 a provincial court of San 
Luis held that articles 1 and 2(c) of provincial Law No. 5344 
regulating sexual and reproductive health, and article 4 of its 
regulatory decree 127/2003, were contrary to the Constitution. The 
first norm states that “the province of San Luis, by means of the 
Ministry of Health, shall provide to the inhabitants who apply for 
it, information, assistance and guidance for responsible 
parenthood, in order to secure and guarantee the human right to 
decide freely and responsibly about reproductive patterns and 
family planning”.47 The second establishes that medical providers 
in public health assistance institutions should prescribe and provide 
contraceptive methods.48 
The local Court understood that this normative plexus was 
contrary to the Constitution because it failed to expressly exclude 
the specific contraceptives that forestall implantation from the 
generic provincial duty of prescribing, providing and inserting 
contraceptives at public health facilities.49 As grounds for this 
argument, the local Court relied on the rule, ostensibly established 
in Portal de Belén, in which any post-coital or emergency 
contraceptive method is to be deemed abortive.50 
                                                                                                             
 46. Cámara Civil, Comercial, Minas y Laboral Nº 2 de San Luis, “Familia y 
Vida Asociación Civil c/ Estado Provincial s/ amparo,” Expte No. 18-F-2002, 
del 21/3/2005. 
 47. Ley No. 5344, art. 1° (Prov. de San Luis, Oct. 30, 2002). 
 48. Dto. 127/03, art. 4° (Prov. de San Luis, Jan. 21, 2003). 
 49. “Familia y Vida Asociación Civil,” supra note 46, at cons. 3.3. 
 50. Id.  
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3. A Second Look at Portal: Applying the pro homine Principle 
in Favor of the Embryo´s Right to Life  
Similar to San Luis Law 5344, Córdoba Law 9073 establishes 
and regulates the so-called “Responsible Motherhood and 
Fatherhood Program,”51 generically making the prescription and 
delivery of contraceptives at health assistance centers depend on 
their non-abortive effect. However, Law 9073 differs from Law 
5344 because the former excludes from the compulsory list of 
allowed contraceptives both emergency contraceptives and the 
intra-uterine device.52 And even if article 7 of Law 9073 allows 
enforcement officers to add new methods of contraception, it 
expressively states that these methods should coincide with those 
previously approved of by competent national authorities. 
 It was thus not the local statute, but the way in which it was 
enforced by the Executive Power, which included the free delivery 
of the so-called emergency contraceptives at public health 
assistance centers, that posed a constitutional problem.53 The local 
Court found this enforcement illegal and unconstitutional. Its 
illegality was grounded precisely on the inconsistency between the 
de facto application and Law 9073, article 6. Its unconstitutionality 
was based almost exclusively on the principles and rules 
established by the Argentine Supreme Court in Portal de Belén, 
showing a partially different interpretation from that of the San 
Luis Court of appeals.  
The main difference between the two holdings lies on the 
reasons for and the scope given to the rule by which emergency 
contraception should be prohibited due to its abortive effect. As 
                                                                                                             
 51. “Programa de maternidad y paternidad responsables,” Ley No. 9073 
(Prov. de Córdoba, Dec. 18, 2002).  
 52. Id. at art. 6°. 
 53. Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de 1a. Nominación, 
sentencia no. 93, “Mujeres por la Vida - Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro —
filial Córdoba— c/ Superior Gobierno de la Provincia de Córdoba s/ amparo ― 
Recurso de apelación,” Expte No. 1270503/36, del 7/8/2008 (Majority: Justices 
Mario Sarsfield Novillo and Mario R. Lescano. Minority (denying the 
injunction): Justice Julio C. Sánchez Torres). 
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stated above, according to the San Luis Court of Appeals, the 
federal Supreme Court was said to have established, in Portal de 
Belén, a kind of iure et de iure presumption that every post-coital 
contraceptive operates via an anti-implantation mechanism. The 
Córdoba court, on the other hand, is slightly more cautious. It does 
not deny the scientific debate regarding the moment of 
implantation, nor does it consider that Portal de Belén has 
definitively solved its legal relevance. Rather, it establishes that the 
existence of scientific doubt over the moment of fertilization is a 
sufficient reason to justify the ban on emergency contraception, 
and it does so by applying the pro homine principle.54  
4. A Third Look at Portal: Applying the pro homine Principle in 
Favor of the Woman´s Right to Reproductive Health 
Holding a contrary view, other Justices have interpreted that 
the pro homine principle should be applied in favor of the 
woman´s right to reproductive health, and, therefore, it should be 
unequivocally determined that an emergency contraceptive method 
has an abortive or anti-implantation nature in order to justify its 
prohibition.55 Some other Justices have only required “sufficient 
proof” that the method’s operation obstructs implantation in the 
specific case in which it is prescribed, which does not necessarily 
amount to certainty.56 
                                                                                                             
 54. See opinion of Justice Sarsfield Novillo, who confirmed the majority’s 
opinion, id. at cons. 11°.  
 55. Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial de 5ta. nominación de 
Rosario, “Mayoraz, Nicolás Fernando c/ Municipalidad de Rosario,” Expte. No. 
1455/02 del 18/06/08, cons. V. 
 56. See opinion of Justice Sánchez Torres in “Mujeres por la Vida,” supra 
note 53, at cons. 15°. Some Courts dismissed on formal grounds challenges to 
the constitutionality of decisions regarding sexual health and reproduction from 
the point of view of the embryo´s right to life. See CSJN, “Morales, Rosa Nélida 
s/ aborto en Moreno” Causa no. 2785, Fallos 319: 3010 (1996); CSJN, “P., F. V. 
s/ amparo,” Fallos 328: 339 (2005) (authorization to induce the labor of an 
anencephalic fetus). In another case it was ordered that an intra-uterine device 
be inserted in a minor child, absolutely regardless of the question of its anti-
implantation or abortive effects. See Cámara de Apelación en lo Civil y 
Comercial–Sala I- La Matanza, “P. C. S. y C., L. A. s/ fuga del hogar,” Expte. 
No. 167 / 1 Res. Def. No. 4/1, del 18/12/2001.  
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D. Embryo Status in the Debate Regarding in vitro Fertilization 
Techniques 
Like the United States Supreme Court, the Argentine Supreme 
Court has not yet delivered an opinion on whether assisted human 
reproduction techniques which, directly or indirectly, lead to 
embryo discard―i.e., embryo destruction―are constitutional. 
Even though many bills57 have been proposed, the issue has not, to 
date, been regulated by statutory Law. Nevertheless, the issue has 
been debated and resolved in the judicial realm in different 
instances. 
1. Rabinovich  
The first, and most well-known, judicial decision was issued in 
Rabinovich58 by the Civil Court of Appeals located in the city of 
Buenos Aires. The case involved a series of measures aiming at 
enforcing the right to life and health of embryos which, up to the 
moment the judicial decision was issued, were held under 
cryopreservation by public or private health institutions in the 
aforementioned city. The judicial decision, issued unanimously, 
was grounded in reasoning that was analogous, though not 
identical, to that adopted two years later by the federal Supreme 
Court in Tanus and Portal de Belén.  
First, it was found that, from the point of view of Argentine 
law, personal life starts at conception; this determination was based 
on a systematic reading of all of the International Human Rights 
Treaties and Conventions that take constitutional precedence under 
article 75.22 of the Argentine Constitution. It was also found that 
                                                                                                             
 57. As an example, see file No. 4423-D-2010, Trámite Parlamentario 080 
(22/06/2010), Régimen de Reproducción Humana Asistida y de Crio 
conservación (Assisted Human Reproduction and Cryopreservation Regime), 
registered by Silvana M. Giudici, Silvia Storni, Agustín A. Portela and Juan P. 
Tunessi. 
 58. CNAC, Sala I, “Rabinovich, Ricardo David s/ medidas precautorias,” 
Expte No. 45882/93, del 3/12/1999. 
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the principle set forth in article 51 of the Argentine Civil Code,59 
according to which a person is every entity that may show 
characteristic human features, has constitutional value.  
But even though anyone may be considered a person for 
constitutional purposes, the acknowledgement of the legal status of 
the embryo requires determining the precise moment when the 
lawful existence of every person starts. In order to resolve this 
issue, the Court of Appeals in Buenos Aires applied article 4.1 of 
the American Convention of Human Rights,60 as the federal 
Supreme Court would later do in Portal de Belén. Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeals, unlike the Supreme Court, paid heed to the 
devaluation of the protection of the no nato that could be seen in 
the expression “in general”, used in this norm. It decided this 
particular semantic incidence by means of a systematic 
interpretation that integrated this norm with the interpretative 
declaration by Argentina on the occasion of the ratification of 
Children´s Rights Convention, according to which, “child” is 
defined as any human being as of the moment of conception.61  
The Court of Appeals, once again unlike the federal Supreme 
Court in Portal, considered the logical possibility that the 
declarations and reservations contained in international treaties 
may not have the same hierarchical legal status as the treaty itself. 
This possibility was neutralized by the phrase contained in article 
75.22, Argentine Constitution, under which the treaties have 
constitutional value “under their actual enforcement conditions” 
(“en las condiciones de su vigencia”). Under the federal Supreme 
Court precedents, this expression ought to refer to the conditions 
                                                                                                             
 59. Art. 51, Cod. Civ. states that “[A]ll beings who show signs 
characteristic of human beings, without any distinction as to qualities or 
accidents, are persons of visible existence.” In Spanish: “Todos los entes que 
presentasen signos característicos de humanidad, sin distinción de cualidades o 
accidentes, son personas de existencia visible.” 
 60. Cited in supra note 40. 
 61. Supra note 40. 
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that effectively regulate the State’s obligations at the international 
level.62  
As in Portal, it was asserted that conception takes place with 
fertilization. Nevertheless, while in Portal the federal Supreme 
Court grounded this interpretation almost exclusively on the 
authority of embryonic science, the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals in Rabinovich was based upon a sort of normative slippery 
slope argument. It stated that all arguments which link legal 
personhood to the emergence of a particular event, such as the 
moment of implantation, or the appearance of the nervous system, 
or even birth, imply that the law doesn´t recognize an equal value 
to all human life.63   
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the embryo and, 
eventually, the monozygotic twins that emerge from the splitting of 
the embryo, possess individual personhood. The Court also 
decided the issue of the humanity and the legal personhood of the 
pronuclear oocyte (i.e., an embryo at the stage that precedes the 
fusion of the female and male gametes’ nuclei) in the following 
way: the oocyte had to be dealt with, by law, in the same way as a 
person, “not by virtue of asserting its personhood . . . but in the 
light of the doubt that arises from the impossibility to exclude it 
with certainty. [This doubt] . . . at the factual level, compels us to 
respect its life and integrity, as if it were a person, a subject of law 
enjoying those rights.”64  
2. Subsequent Cases 
In three cases that arose after Rabinovich, the debate regarding 
the embryonic legal status involved the parents´ claim that the 
                                                                                                             
 62. See “Rabinovich,” supra note 58, at cons. VI, citing CSJN, “Giroldi, 
Horacio D. y otro s/ recurso de casación - causa n° 32/93,” Fallos, 318: 514 
(1995). 
 63. Supra note 58, at cons. VI and VII. 
 64. Id. at cons. VII. 
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social care institution (“obra social”)65 they belonged to should 
cover the costs involved in assisted fertilization treatment.66 
Opinions delivered in these cases can be ranked incrementally 
regarding the legal value of the embryo´s life, as follows: 
a. The parents´ right to have in vitro fertilization procedures 
covered by medical insurance is affirmed, fully bypassing the 
problem of the use of un-implanted embryos;67 or explicitly 
eluding a decision on embryotic personhood on the basis that it 
would be a religious question, alien to the scope of intervention by 
the State;68 or else rejecting the abortive nature of any fertilization 
treatment, on the ground that, out of a conceptual necessity, it 
cannot be considered abortive. None of these opinions referred 
either to the Supreme Court precedent in Portal, or to 
Rabinovich.69  
b. The parents’ ‘right to have the in vitro fertilization procedure 
covered by medical insurance is affirmed, and there is a proposal, 
but without binding force, regarding the possibility of donating the 
supernumerary or surplus embryos for their later implantation, or 
alternatively, for their therapeutic use or experimentation.70 
c. The parents’ right to have the in vitro fertilization procedure 
covered by medical care insurance is affirmed, but it is 
                                                                                                             
 65. Obras Sociales are health insurance/health care programs that are 
primarily administered by trade unions for the benefit of the union members and 
their families (although there are other types of obras sociales, such as those 
administered by each Argentine province for workers in the public sector). They 
are funded by compulsory payroll contributions by employees and employers. 
 66. Juzg. CAyT N°6 de la C.A.B.A., “A.M.R. y otros c/ Obra Social de la 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires,” 20/11/07, LL 2008-A, 148, El Dial AA439C 
(reaffirmed by the CCAyT de la C.A.B.A.); Cámara de Apelaciones en lo 
Contencioso Administrativo de San Nicolás, “S.A.F y A.H.A c/ IOMA,” 
15/12/08, LL 2009-A, 408; Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Mar del Plata, 
“Loo, Hernán Alejandro y otra c/ IOMA y otra,” 29/12/08, available at 
http://www.cij.gov.ar (last visited Jul. 15, 2013). 
 67. See “A.M.R. y otros c/ Obra Social,” supra note 66 (opinion of Justice 
P. López Vergara).  
 68. See “S.A.F y A.H.A c. IOMA,” supra note 66, opinion of Justice 
Schreginger, cons. 5°, joined by Justice Cebey. 
 69. See “S.A.F y A.H.A c/ IOMA,” supra note 66, at cons. 5° (opinion of 
Justice Schreginger, joined by Justice Cebey).  
 70. See “Loo c/ IOMA,” supra note 66 (opinion of Justice Ferro).  
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simultaneously held that legal personhood is recognized from the 
moment of fertilization, and it is ordered that a guardian be 
appointed to safeguard their physical integrity, considering the 
precedent in Portal as valid and binding, and joining the opinion 
delivered by the Court in Rabinovich, but not finding that decision 
binding given the different jurisdictions involved, i.e., national and 
provincial.71 
d. The parents´ claim that the infertility treatment be covered 
by the social care plan is rejected on the basis that it represents a 
clear threat to the supernumerary or surplus un-implanted 
embryos´ right to life, as interpreted after the Portal decision.72 
IV. A COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS FROM THE TELEOLOGICAL AND 
SEMANTIC POINT OF VIEW 
If there is any value in the orderly review of judicial decisions 
and the grounds for them, this doesn´t rely either on their 
thoroughness or on their unattainable definitive nature. It relies, 
instead, on the possibility of drawing comparisons and contrasts of 
both legal practices regarding processes of conceptual construction 
and determination, in the light of the claim that fundamental rights 
are deontological, absolute and/or unconditional.  
A. The “Practical” Legal Value of the Embryo´s Life Compared  
1. It should be pointed out that U.S. constitutional judicial law 
in the field of embryonic legal status is much older than the 
Argentine one. It was only in 2001 that the first judicial decision 
was issued in Argentina, while the first U.S. precedent, which set 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. (opinion of Justices Tazza and Comparato).  
 72. See opinion of Justice Valdez, id. at cons. X and XI, especially cons. XI 
in fine. After these cases were decided, the province of Buenos Aires’ legislature 
passed Statute 14208, B.O. 26507 (Jan. 3, 2011), regulated by Dto. 2080/2011, 
which classified human infertility as a disease, and therefore included in vitro 
fertilization in the so-called “compulsory medical assistance plan”, according to 
which both private and public health insurance plans should include the 
treatment as a free service.  
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forth the position of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the value of 
unborn (“potential”) human life, was issued in 1973. 
2. Under the American case law reviewed, the legal value of 
human life is not uniform; it varies according to the stage of 
development that an unborn human being has reached. Such stages 
do not exist in the Argentine Supreme Court case law, which 
considers that there is a genre (“persons”) that embraces the one 
“to be born” from the moment of conception, and conception 
occurs on the occasion of fertilization. Not distinguishing stages 
implies that there is a ban on any action knowingly aimed at 
interrupting, either in an eventual or probable way, the 
development of the embryo after fertilization.  
3. Embryos and pre-embryos in American case law fit in the 
first stage (“non-viable potential human life”) and are subject to 
state interest, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. This state 
interest in the protection of human life is independent from the 
interest that the holder of the right to life may have over his or her 
own life.73 This independence is particularly relevant in order to 
                                                                                                             
 73. This principle was applied forty-four years later as grounds for denying 
a fundamental right to assisted suicide, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). The grounds for state 
interest in human life are discussed in depth, both by those who approve of Roe 
and those who oppose it. Among many others, see Alec Walen, The 
Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to the Unborn, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 161, 178 (2005), who highlights the way in which this claimed 
interest would threaten the rights stated in Roe for women. See also James Bopp 
& Richard Coleson, Judicial Standard of Review and Webster, 15 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 211, 216 (1989). The idea that states hold an interest in human life which 
is not conceptually linked to personhood was particularly developed by Ronald 
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 
59 CHICAGO L. REV. 381 (1992). This idea was then picked up by Justice 
Stevens in Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 n.2; and in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. at 747. This same conceptual distinction is also present in other 
constitutional practices, as is shown in the famous leading Spanish case de-
criminalizing abortion, T.C., s. no. 53/1985 at FJ5, B.O.E. no. 119, May 18, 
1985. For an academic discussion of the plausibility of this distinction see 
certain commentaries on DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, such as Gerard V. 
Bradley, Life’s Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 
(1993); Alexander Morgan Capron, Philosophy and Theory: Life’s Sacred Value 
- Common Ground or Battleground?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1491 (1994); Abner S. 
Green, Uncommon Ground, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994); Frances M. 
Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, 95 
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protect the life of citizens that have not, as of yet, acquired the 
ability to express their own interests.  
4. The state interest in non-viable potential human life is 
compelling enough as to justify the binding nature of certain 
measures aimed at discouraging the decision to abort, but no other 
practical effect is attached to it. For, although under U.S. case law, 
un-implanted embryos are said to not be included among property 
rights, there is no restriction governing the progenitors´ will over 
embryos where even the will of only one of the parties is sufficient 
to legally justify their discard. 
5. It is unarguable that judicial decisions issued in Argentina 
recognize more legal value in embryonic life than those in the 
U.S., which considers that legal value arises only once the time of 
non-viability is passed. In Argentina, however, even if the limited 
case law corpus in existence shows a generalized acceptance of the 
general principle that embryonic life is personal life before and 
after implantation, this uniformity disappears when it comes to 
determining the constitutionality of rules and courses of action 
which imply the potential or actual discarding of embryos.  
6. In Argentina, the debate over the treatment owed to embryos 
is primarily focused on the legal effects of fertilization methods 
that could involve discarding embryos, and on the normative 
consequences of the scientific debate regarding the anti-
implantation mechanism of the emergency contraceptive and the 
intrauterine device, or any other contraceptive that might operate to 
prevent embryotic implantation.  
7. The discussion over contraceptive and fertilization methods 
in Argentina assumes—with or without reason, which is not 
evaluated here—the normative premise that women have a right of 
                                                                                                             
 
COLUM. L. REV. 160 (1995) (book review); Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of 
Human Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049 (1994) (book review); Tom Stacy, Reconciling 
Reason and Religion: On Dworkin and Religious Freedom, 63 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1 (1994); and more extensively, Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A 
Critique of his Theory of Inviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289 (1997). 
 
 
130 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
access to them. Courts differ in the way in which they weigh this 
perceived women´s right with the embryo´s right to life, as 
recognized in Portal de Belén, Tanus and Rabinovich. The 
contraceptive methods debate is centered upon the weight and 
sense of the pro-homine principle. In particular, it concerns how 
much certainty this principle requires regarding the anti-
implantation element of these methods. Alternatively, this 
discussion does not arise from the U.S. case law, which, by 
acknowledging the concept of “non-viable potential human life” 
and by allowing for the disposal of the embryo itself, undermines 
the primary assertion of that principle.  
B. The Justificatory and Semantic Postulates Compared 
Judicial debates regarding the legal status of the embryo will 
continue unfolding and getting richer and richer, both on the U.S. 
and Argentine scenes, as long as the social factors that trigger it are 
present. Still, even at this early stage of development, this 
comparative synthesis makes evident the unfolding of a semantic-
anthropological debate relating to the most radical conceptual 
distinction in the world of law: that which separates things on the 
one hand, and persons on the other.  
The question at hand is to whom do we give the distinction of 
person or subject of law, and why. But this question cannot be 
resolved if there is no previously adopted viewpoint in relation to a 
more abstract and thus more fundamental, semantic debate: how 
are things classified in general in the world and, in particular, in 
the legal world? Are conceptual classifications the result of a 
reflexive, yet somehow explicit, social debate that the law is 
destined to adopt, at least as long as there prior consent exists? Are 
they an interested imposition of a social group that is picked up by 
the law and clothed with its coactive force? Or are they something 
similar to a representation of reality, which emerges before us 
already classified, if not thoroughly, at least partially?  
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Regarding the embryo´s legal personhood, these questions 
could be restated in the following way: Do the constitutional 
judicial practices here reviewed find the personal or un-personal 
nature of the embryo as the product of some sort of social 
construction, or do they view it as something already given to 
understanding, as an ob-jectum? Which is the semantic theory 
implied in the interpretative arguments used in both of the 
practices here reviewed?  
In what follows, we will address these issues by considering 
three consecutive and intertwined levels of approach: (a) the 
relation of interpretive arguments to moral and anthropological 
justificatory stances of interpretation (section 1); (b) the semantics 
grounding these anthropological and moral stances of 
interpretation (section 2); and (c) an evaluation of the coherence 
between the categorical nature of fundamental principles and these 
semantic approaches to the concept of legal personhood (title V).  
 1. The Justificatory Perspective of Interpretation Compared  
The main interpretative argument sustaining the denial of legal 
personhood to the unborn in Roe was the contrario sensu 
argument: if the constitutional text does not entitle the unborn to 
legal personhood, then it should be excluded from this legal 
concept´s system of reference.74 But as it has frequently been 
noted, this same constitutional text does not mention either the 
right to abort, or even the right to privacy—of which abortion is 
considered to be a concrete application. Facing the silence of the 
constitutional text, there was space, at least from a logical point of 
view, both to recognize and to deny legal personhood to the 
unborn.75 As was noted above, this interpretative argument 
                                                                                                             
 74. See supra notes 8-10.  
 75. Regarding the logical ambivalence of the contrario sensu argument see 
GEORGE KALINOWSKI, INTRODUCCIÓN A LA LÓGICA JURÍDICA 177-79 (J.A. 
Causabón trans., Eudeba 1973), and LUIGI LOMBARDI VALLAURI, CORSO DI 
FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 95-100 (CEDAM 1981). Regarding the feeble legal 
grounds for neglecting constitutional personhood for the unborn, see, e.g., 
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advanced in Roe vs. Wade against the acknowledgement of the 
legal personhood of the unborn was never revisited. All later cases 
assume, as part of Roe´s holding, that all unborn life is not to be 
considered “personal life” (and not even human life, but “potential 
human life”).76  
The logical ambivalence of the interpretative argument shows 
that the actual reason sustaining the majority´s decision in Roe—
and in the subsequent cases which assume without discussion that 
the unborn is not a person according to the Constitution—is a 
moral and anthropological conception of the person, which is 
assumed as the obvious, and thus not explicitly stated, justificatory 
point of constitutional practices. A moral conception according to 
which the faculty for autonomy grounds the right to be treated with 
“equal respect and consideration,” as assumed in the constitutional 
concept of “privacy.”77 And an anthropological concept of person, 
by which it is this same faculty (autonomy) that distinguishes 
human beings from other species.  
Although the Argentine Supreme Court in Tanus and Portal 
had to deal with much more explicit texts regarding the legal status 
of the unborn (recognizing its legal personhood and a right to life 
from the moment of conception), none of these texts explicitly 
states the moment when conception takes place, nor which kind of 
legal protection is due to the unborn. Perhaps aiming to profit from 
the credibility of scientific discourse, the Argentine Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
 
Charles Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human 
Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in the Fourteenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, at 361 (2006/2007); or Martin 
Ronheimmer, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of Life in 
a Constitutional Democracy: A Constitutionalist Approach to the Encyclical 
Evangelium Vitae, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 158-59 (1998). In any case, even some 
of those who approve of the decision in Roe notice that neglecting the 
constitutional personhood of the unborn is a main dimension of the case´s 
holding. See Jack M. Balkin, How Genetic Technologies will Transform Roe vs. 
Wade, 56 EMORY L. J. 843-64, at 845 (2007).  
 76. See supra notes 13-22, 28-36. 
 77. This teleological assumption was explicitly stated in Casey, 505 U.S. at 
852.  
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in Portal based its interpretation concerning the moment of 
conception almost exclusively on geneticists´ findings.78 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the American Supreme Court 
in Roe—and all the other Courts which relied upon this decision—
utilized the same scientific concepts and findings, and still 
attributed to them different practical (moral and legal) 
consequences.  
The availability of these scientific findings for all of the 
Courts—Argentine and North-American—dealing with the 
embryo´s status shows the Argentine Supreme Court decision in 
Portal was not only grounded in the scientific description of 
human life, but also in the moral concept of “person,” from which 
this scientific data was interpreted. For the main question being 
posed to all of the Courts was not, “when does genetics situate the 
appearance of a new human being?”, but rather the anthropological 
and moral question, “when should dignity, and thus legal 
personhood, be recognized in a new human being?” The 
underlying reason sustaining the majority interpretative conclusion 
in Portal is thus the concrete answer to this question: the reference 
of the concept of dignity is co-extensive with the reference of the 
concept of human nature, independent of the factual possibilities of 
it being actualized.  
 2. Implied Semantics Theories Compared  
The different legal status granted to the embryo in one 
constitutional case law practice or the other is due not only, nor 
primarily, to textual differences, but also to the use of different 
moral conceptions of the person as teleological or justificatory 
stances of interpretation. Stated in this way, it should be considered 
if and how the Courts link this justificatory stance of interpretation 
to the semantic meaning of the texts, and which are the epistemic 
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and semantic theories implied in the use of these justificatory 
stances. In fact, both questions are closely related.  
Scientific, moral and anthropological approaches to the nature 
and value of human embryos are explicitly passed over in 
American case law concerning the legal status of the embryo. It is 
as if Wittgenstein´s theory of “language games” had been radically 
interpreted and the “legal game” had been taken to be completely 
alien to other “language games” where the concept of personhood 
was also the object of discussion, and particularly, where an insight 
into an “outside” world seemed to be allowed.  
This aspiration for the autonomy of legal language from other 
fields of language, be it morals or science, discloses at least two 
semantic assumptions. First, that the justificatory viewpoint of 
interpretation is internal to the legal practice, and second, that the 
frame of reference of legal concepts is absolutely determined by 
their use within the practice. In effect, if the legal concept of 
personhood bears no relation to the moral concept of the person, or 
even to scientific findings about human life, it seems that the legal 
concept is nothing more than a product of legal decisions. It is not 
surprising, then, that arguments determining the legal value of the 
embryo were always grounded on the way the Constitution “uses” 
the concept of person; or on the presumed intention of the 
Constitutional authors when using constitutional concepts; and on 
the absence of precedents recognizing legal personhood in unborn 
life, and thus, on the fact that the concept of legal personhood has 
not yet been used in reference to the embryo.79  
This semantic assumption, by which the use of legal concepts 
within the legal community is the only criteria for determining its 
frame of reference, also seems applicable to the concept of “special 
respect” that is owed to embryos as an intermediate category 
between things and persons. In effect, this concept, introduced to 
legal practice in Davis v. Davis, is not founded upon any insight 
                                                                                                             
 79. See supra notes 8-10. 
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into the value of human life as considered from a natural, 
metaphysical, or even a conventionally moral point of view. It is, 
instead, exclusively grounded on a kind of extension of other legal 
concepts, which have been used for a longer time. It is like a mix 
of the concepts of “property,” “born human life,” and “unborn but 
viable human life.”80 And being a mix of all three, it has neither 
the same significance nor, of course, the same legal force, as the 
third of the three. That is why this “special respect” amounts to 
less than nothing from a practical point of view, for if there is a 
rule concerning the destiny of embryos, it is that they should be 
discarded in case of disagreement between the progenitors.  
Argentine case law is not as uniform as the American one in 
the degree to which the connection is acknowledged between 
different “language games,” and the semantic theory implied 
therein. The metaphysical and moral perspectives of interpretation 
do not seem clearly acknowledged in Portal and Tanus, where the 
legal status of the embryo is asserted as a necessary conclusion 
based on scientific and legal statements.81 It is plainly stated in 
Rabinovich, where, in the face of both the textual indeterminacy 
concerning the embryo´s legal status and the fact of scientific 
discussions concerning the moment when a new human being 
appears, the Court of Appeals based its interpretation of the 
embryo as a legal person on the moral and legal pro homine 
principle.82  
In any case, this more or less open recognition that the legal 
“language game” is connected to the scientific and moral ones 
expresses both the conviction that legal concepts are not purely 
constructed from the inside of the legal practice, and that 
something exists prior to human social practices and language 
which claims respect.  
                                                                                                             
 80. See supra note 30. 
 81. See supra notes 38-41. 
 82. See supra notes 58-64. 
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is also clear that all of 
the Argentine Courts complemented this attention to the biological 
and moral nature of a human person with the actual use of the 
concept itself within the legal practice, when interpreting the 
concept of legal personhood. The role of use within the legal 
practice was particularly relevant when the question was not to 
determine the definition of legal personhood, but rather what the 
legal consequences of recognizing the entitlement to legal 
personhood are; or how the law should deal with scientific doubts 
concerning the moment when fecundation takes place;83 or the way 
contraceptives operate. These questions were, in all cases, 
approached with interpretative rules internal to the Argentine legal 
practice, such as the principle of pro homine.  
As mentioned above, not all Argentine Courts enforced this 
principle with the same consequences. Some of them applied it in 
favor of the mother´s assumed right to conceive children, and 
others in favor of the life of the embryo. Two related explanations 
can be advanced for this disagreement. In the first place, the 
proposition referred to by the legal statement “pro homine” is not 
at all evident or manifest. It is not evident if the principle is an 
appropriate ground for determining who is entitled to its 
protection, nor is it clear who should benefit when its enforcement 
postpones another person´s claimed rights.    
Second, precisely because of this lack of manifestation, its 
practical significance differs according to the concept of justice 
from which each interpreter determines the global and final 
justificatory point of law. The more this concept of justice is 
attached to privacy and moral autonomy, the less value is 
attributed to the life of an embryo, which corresponds to less 
entitlement to legal protection. On the contrary, the more the 
concept of justice is attached to dignity as a universal and non-
variable claim of respect—related to the concept of moral 
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autonomy, but not to be confused with it—the more value is 
attributed to embryotic life, resulting in a greater entitlement to 
legal protection. 
V. WHICH SEMANTIC THEORY SHOULD GOVERN LEGAL PRACTICE? 
Two semantic strategies and conceptions underlie the two legal 
practices compared here: a traditional, or “criterial,” semantics on 
one side, and a sort of “light”—with ample space for social 
construction—realist semantics on the other. The last question to 
be posed is: which of these is more coherent with the categorical 
and universal nature of fundamental rights? 
The discussions regarding which is the semantic praxis that 
better fits these features of fundamental rights are too ample to be 
reviewed in this article. However, it seems appropriate, at least, to 
point out that they lead us back to the basic choice that was stated 
above, i.e., either the fundamental rights principles are social 
constructions that precede and determine their own frame of 
reference; or else their reference—some basic human good—
precedes and determines its meaning.84 
                                                                                                             
 84. As is well known, the alternative between giving priority to reference 
over meaning when determining the sense of concepts was stated and developed 
in the field of Philosophy of Language by SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND 
NECESSITY (Blackwell 1980), and Hillary Putnam, Meaning and Reference, 70 
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If the meaning or concept of fundamental rights is exclusively 
the product of a more or less controlled social construction, and 
more importantly, if a construed meaning determines its own field 
of reference, it would be extremely hard to predicate the 
universality and absoluteness of fundamental rights principles. By 
contrast, their extension as its categorical or absolute nature would 
depend upon the will for a social construction of meaning to lead. 
Some political philosophers supporting this constructive approach 
to fundamental rights principles have openly admitted that it is 
irreconcilable with their categorical and universal nature, 
particularly when applied to the legal concept of personhood.85  
 Others are much more reticent to admit this openly. Thus, 
Ronald Dworkin has expressly rejected what he deems to be a 
criterial semantic approach to law, according to which all legal 
concepts—including the concept of law itself—are constructed 
from inside the practice, with no other basis than the sheer fact of a 
convergence of their criteria in use within the practice. Against this 
claim, Dworkin contends that legal concepts are interpretative and 
thus there is no need of fundamental convergence in their use.86 
Additionally, he has pointed out that legal and political concepts 
are the product of a collective constructive practice in the light of 
moral and political values and, in the end, in the light of a 
substantive conception of what qualifies as a good life. In this 
sense, he aims to distinguish himself not only from classical 
positivistic approaches to law, which claim the neutral nature of 
the constructive process of legal concepts, but also from Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice, which aspires to exclude “comprehensive 
conceptions” from the constructive process of political values.87  
Ronald Dworkin’s answer to them both is that all interpretative 
concepts are the product of a holistic constructive practice that 
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synthesizes natural, moral, legal, and political concepts. This 
holistic account seems much more faithful to legal practice than 
the “criterial one.” In effect, as has been shown above, both the 
Argentine and the American Courts rely on a holistic approach to 
the concept of legal personhood, no matter how much they both try 
to disguise this fact.  
Now, as we have previously mentioned, it is obvious that 
criterial semantics implies a negative answer to the question of 
deference to reality. But the opposite is not obvious. For the 
question is not only to what degree are legal concepts related to 
moral, political or natural concepts, but also, if anything exists 
prior to the whole conceptual constructive process itself. To this 
Ronald Dworkin would answer “no,” or better, “it doesn´t matter”: 
the only basis for the whole constructive process is a “reflective 
equilibrium” between coherence and conviction.88 But this mix of 
conviction and coherence is all that Dworkin claims for moral 
objectivism.  
There is no place in his theory—nor any need, according to 
him—for self-evident or self-justified practical propositions, or for 
the claim that these propositions bear any relationship with human 
nature.89 And it should be noted that although self-justified, 
practical propositions are generally the object of moral and 
political convictions, this is not always the case or, much more 
importantly, their epistemic justification.  
Now, without reference to self-justified practical propositions, 
there is no critical instance with which to confront the whole 
conceptual constructive process.90 Instead, if reference leads the 
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abstraction of meaning, when legal authorities construe intricate 
and obscure meanings (as, in fact, they have already done in 
relation to the legal concepts of “person” and “special respect”), 
the reality referred to by these legal and moral concepts would 
make clear that there is abuse in the use of language. For no matter 
how much imperium courts may have to construct and reconstruct 
concepts in the social sphere in general, and in the world of law in 
particular, they lack the power to transform, and least of all to 
deny, the referential frame of this construction. In other words, if 
reference precedes meaning, then human or fundamental rights 
principles and their characteristic universality—for each and every 
one—and absoluteness, in all cases, would be invulnerable to the 
abuses of language.91 
Having reached this stage of the discussion, it is worthwhile to 
ask, one last time: which semantic practice better fits the 
conceptual, and therefore the necessary, characteristics of human 
rights? A practice that construes concepts from a vacuum, or a 
practice that construes them from a grasp of reality? In this latter 
case, how does the reality referred to by the concept of human 
rights narrow the construction of the legal concept of person? Is it 
not by imposing the only condition that its admittance be universal 
for every man, and absolute in each and every situation?  
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